Abstract-Transportation Network Companies employ dynamic pricing methods at periods of peak travel to incentivise driver participation and balance supply and demand for rides. Surge pricing multipliers are commonly used and are applied following demand and estimates of customer and driver trip valuations. Combinatorial double auctions have been identified as a suitable alternative, as they can achieve maximum social welfare in the allocation by relying on customers and drivers stating their valuations. A shortcoming of current models, however, is that they fail to account for the effects of trip detours that take place in shared trips and their impact on the accuracy of pricing estimates. To resolve this, we formulate a new shared-ride assignment and pricing algorithm using combinatorial double auctions. We demonstrate that this model is reduced to a maximum weighted independent set model, which is known to be APX-hard. A fast local search heuristic is also presented, which is capable of producing results that lie within 1% of the exact approach. Our proposed algorithm could be used as a fast and reliable assignment and pricing mechanism of ride-sharing requests to vehicles during peak travel times.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE recent proliferation of Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) has been facilitated by an increasing demand for efficient, economic and personalised modes of urban mobility. TNCs have quickly captured significant share of the urban mobility market, by providing a service that is usually cheaper than taxis, more convenient than public transport, and an effective alternative to private car ownership. Their success has been underpinned by the use of powerful algorithms and analytics, which helped reduce waiting times and increase fleet utilisation [1] , [2] .
To maintain a balance between the supply and demand for rides, TNCs frequently apply dynamic pricing measures [3] usually taking the form of variable surge tariff multipliers. Such measures can motivate drivers to attend under-served areas, dampen demand by eliminating requests from riders that are delaying their departure, and also incentivize shared rides between customers or the use public transport (PT) [4] .
Through these methods, TNCs effectively operate a twosided market, to the beneffit of both the drivers and the riders. As many major TNCs consider to deploy Autonomous R. Karamanis, E. Anastasiadis, P. Angeloudis and M. Stettler are with the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Imperial College London, UK, e-mail: renos.karamanis10@imperial.ac.uk.
Vehicles (AVs) in the near future, their platforms are likely to be transformed into one-sided markets, where they will enjoy complete control of the supply [5] . Previous work by Karamanis et al. [6] demonstrated that such platforms can still incentivise the use of shared rides or PT transport while remaining profitable.
Existing dynamic pricing methods suggest new equilibrium prices to customers without having prior knowledge of their trip valuations. If these are considered, market equilibrium prices could be identified without approximation, therefore transforming this process into an auction. Previous work on dynamic pricing using auction theory [7] - [10] focused on the interactions between riders (bidders) and drivers (sellers) who are expected to declare their valuations and costs for prospective rides.
A TNC platform, taking the role of the auctioneer, would be responsible for determining the winner of each auction [10] . Possible auction settings might involve one or multiple drivers that are assigned to customers sequentially or simultaneously. Manipulations of the auctions by either side can be avoided through the use of mechanism design theory, and the analysis of participation incentives.
Combinatorial Double Auctions (CDAs) [11] can be used to allocate multiple drivers to riders simultaneously and efficiently 1 using linear programs that are commonly referred to as winner determination problems (WDP) [8] , which are known to be NP-hard. WDPs can be formulated as set packing problems that maximise the auctioneer's revenue (or social welfare) while taking into account the utilities of the participants [12] .
Research in dynamic ride-sharing (DRS) (carpooling), is particularly relevant, with several studies exploring the applicability of auction models between commuting drivers and riders [7] , [13] , [14] . In [7] , the authors propose a CDA discounted trade reduction mechanism for DRS assignment and pricing. The proposed mechanism is found to be incentive-compatible 2 , individually rational 3 and weakly budget-balanced 4 . A system of parallel DRS auctions was proposed in [13] aiming to identify rider-driver matches that minimise detours. A DRS model using mechanism design was presented in [14] , demonstrating that maximum social welfare cannot be feasibly reached while incentivising the participation of commuters and truthful reporting of trip reservation prices.
Lam [8] models the allocation of AV seats to customers as a combinatorial auction, using the Vickrey-Clarkes-Grove (VCG) mechanism to sequentially assign customers to vehicles and determine prices. Three types of service are considered: private rides, shared rides and requests split over multiple vehicles. A separate study developed a CDA model for dial-aride AV fleets [10] where multiple customers and AV operators submit bids, while a platform determines allocations that maximise social welfare. The model is applied for three types of service as in [8] , with prices computed using a relaxed version of the problem with Lagrangian multipliers. The algorithm is shown to be NP-hard, but optimal solutions can still be obtained for realistic problem instances in reasonable times. Another proposed technique [9] , [16] involves a truthful DRS mechanism based on a second-price auction with reserve prices.
The majority of studies on ride-sharing auctions (Table  I) use two-dimensional models that perform one-to-one assignments between buyers and sellers. Nonetheless, DRS outputs inherently consist of one-to-many assignments for trips that contain at least three participants (one driver, two riders), whose trip-time utilities are interdependent. This limitation was partially addressed by previous studies [8] , [10] which, however, did not consider detour effects. An alternative approach [9] utilised sequential rider-vehicle matches, but without accounting for the effect of detours on valuations, assignments and pricing estimates.
To address this literature gap, we develop a mathematical model that considers the effects of shared-ride detours through a winner determination process. This implements a sealed-bid CDA, with simultaneous driver-rider assignments that seek to maximise the total trade surplus. To reduce the problem search space, we build upon the concept of shareability networks [17] , and transform the formulation into a Maximum Weighted Independent Set Problem (MWIS), which is known to be APXhard.
Our contribution is summarised as follows: 1) We propose a WDP model for DRS assignment, implementing a CDA while considering the effect of detours on the valuations of auction participants. 2) We provide a local search algorithm which produces near-optimal results in polynomial time. 3) We evaluate the effects of shill bidding on our proposed CDA solutions and suggest methods to ensure the stability of the process. The paper is structured as follows: Section II outlines our proposed assignment and pricing methodology for shared rides. An exact implementation of the model and an approximate heuristic are described in section III alongside a case study for a hypothetical TNC in New York. Findings and recommendations for future work are provided in section IV.
II. METHODOLOGY
Our model assumes that travellers request shared rides through a central TNC platform that operates its own vehicle Assignments are performed in intervals with duration ∆ -given the larger pool of possible matches; this quasi-online approach is expected to outperform a possible first-in-firstout (FIFO) alternative ( [10] , [17] ). Two assignment types are considered: the first is between riders willing to share a trip (i.e. rider-rider), and the latter pertains to vehicles that would like to offer trips (vehicle-riders). In both cases, the algorithm seeks to identify potentially combinable requests, therefore establishing shareability networks [17] that serve as inputs to the CDA model alongside traveller trip valuations. Any vehicles or travellers that are not matched by the CDA are deferred to later model executions alongside any requests that might have emerged in the meantime.
A. Pre-matching
The pre-matching stage is used to filter incompatible vehicle-rider and rider-rider combinations before the execution of the CDA, therefore reducing instance sizes without penalising solution quality. Quality indices δ w and δ d are used to reflect the maximum allowable rider wait time, and detours 5 respectively. Let R represent a set of ride requests and K a set of vehicles operated by the platform.
For each vehicle k ∈ K we seek to obtain a subset N k ⊆ R that the vehicle can access within a period with approximate duration δ w . Conversely, for each ride request r ∈ R, we seek to identify a subset A r ⊆ K that can be picked up within δ w .
A ride request r is placed in N k and a vehicle k is placed in A r according to Algorithm 1 if condition C 0 (eq. (1)) is met, where T ( k, r ) is the travel time from the current location of vehicle k to the origin of request r, and T (c) is the execution time of a stop sequence c.
In the case of rider-rider matching, we obtain the subset of second requests I r ⊆ R \ r that can be matched with a request r ∈ R and executed with a detour lasting δ d or less. We also obtain a subset of requests J r ⊆ R \ r that can be matched with r as the second rider in the vehicle, also with a detour Algorithm 1 Prematching check: Vehicle-Rider
end for end for of δ d or less. As such, for every request pair i, j ∈ R, i = j where i and j are the first and second rider, respectively, there exists a set of origin-destination
The following conditions apply:
In eq. (2)- (5), P r represents the travel time for a private trip r ∈ R. Algorithm 2 is used to prematch rider pairssince these are obtained alongside vehicle-rider the complexity of these operations is O(|R| 2 ) [17] . The maximum possible total detour and waiting time for any rider r ∈ R once the assignment is confirmed is δ w + δ d due to pre-matching.
Algorithm 2 Prematching check: Rider-Rider
The resulting adjacency subsets N k , A r , I r and J r can be visualised using a network where nodes represent vehicles or ride requests. A link from a vehicle k to rider r exists if r ∈ N k (and consequently k ∈ A r ), whereas a link between riders i and j exists if j ∈ I i (and consequently i ∈ J j ) or viceversa. Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the auction participants' initial locations and the result of pre-matching respectively, in a randomly generated problem instance of 20 vehicles and 40 riders in Manhattan, New York City.
B. Combinatorial Double Auction
Our auction model builds upon [10] by introducing a trading good and applying a shareability network to reduce search space. Furthermore, it takes into account the quality of shared trips and the proximity of vehicles to achieve higher time savings. As a result, riders would obtain different overall trip valuations when matched to different passengers or vehicles, while the pool of potential assignments would be further honed due to the use of a trip compatibility network. Without loss of generality, we assume that individual trip requests only consist of single riders. This assumption can be relaxed to extend the model to cater for larger passenger groups.
We consider a set of riders R and a set of vehicles K. Each rider r ∈ R is identified as a 6-element tuple F r , C r , P r , I r , J r , A r , where F r is the maximum reservation price, C r is the time valuation, P r is an 1D array of vehicle travel times required for a private trip (pick-up to drop-off), while I r , J r and A r are the adjacency subsets obtained through pre-matching (Section II-A).
The 3D array S i,j,n represents the remaining vehicle travel time for matched riders i and j, once the final passenger is picked up, with the pick-up sequence in the order o i , o j . We use 3 dimensions for S i,j,n to account for i and j having different remaining travel times once j is picked up. For example, if i is dropped off first, the remaining time for i might be T ( o j , d i ), whereas the remaining time for j could be
At the same time, the remaining travel time for the vehicle would be T ( o j , d i , d j ). Using the procedure described in Algorithm 2, we obtain the assignment with the shortest total vehicle time. Finally, the index n can take values between [1, 2, 3], denoting whether S i,j,n refers to the first or final passenger to be picked up, or the vehicle itself, respectively.
The array W i,j is used to represent the vehicle travel time from vehicle origins i to rider origins j, for i ∈ K ∪ R, j ∈ R. The binary decision variable x i,j ∈ {0, 1} is used to indicate if a vehicle or request i is assigned by the action to request j, such that i ∈ K ∪ R, j ∈ R. Then let:
denote the driving times from the pick-up to drop-off location of the first and second passenger respectively. Similarly, let:
be the driving time from the pick-up location of the first passenger to the drop-off location of the last passenger. The total service time t r of each request r is therefore defined as follows:
Using the waiting and travel time from (9) we can define the reservation price f (r) for rider r as follows:
The utility u r of a rider with respect to request r is:
where p k,r (t r ) in (11) is the corresponding service charge for rider r when is assigned to vehicle k, as a function of the travel time t r . Its value is determined by the platform and is equal to zero if vehicle k is not assigned to request r. Each available vehicle k ∈ K, is described as a 3-tuple B k , Q k , N k ; where B k is its marginal operational cost, Q k is its capacity before assignment and N k is a subset defining riders in its vicinity (calculated as per Section II-A). We define the travel time d k to serve a particular set of riders for vehicle k, from starting to travel to the first rider until the delivery of the last rider as follows:
Using eq. (12), we define the cost of serving the riders assigned to each vehicle k as:
As such, the total utility for vehicle k when included in the auction process is defined by:
To identify the winners of the auction and the assignment of vehicles to riders, we adopt a WDP methodology that simultaneously considers all rider bids and vehicle costs. To achieve this, we modify the structure of the existing formulation to ensure that utilities equal to zero if rider r cannot be served or vehicle k is not assigned, for rider and vehicle utilities respectively.
Since t r and d k both equal to zero if rider r or vehicle k are not included in any assignments, the versions of the rider utility u r and vehicle utility µ k are transformed as follows:
where the term X r = k∈Ar x k,r + i∈Ir x i+|K|,r indicates whether rider r is in the auction either as a first or as a second client. The model aims to maximise the total utility of all the participants (vehicles and riders), with the objective function defined as follows:
where SW indicates the value of social welfare. Observe that the service charges cancel out in the summation of the participants' utilities. The optimisation problem is then formulated with the following set of constraints:
Model 1 (Winner Determination Problem for Ride Sharing):
subject to
Eq. (18b) ensures that the number of assigned riders to each vehicle k is at most equal to the vehicle capacity Q k if assigned with a rider r. (18c) guarantees that if rider r is assigned, it is either the first rider or the second passenger to board. Eqs. (18d) and (18e) utilize the Big M method [18] to ensure that if any two riders are matched, the first rider r in the matching has to be picked up by a vehicle k. M is defined as a sufficiently large positive number.
Eq. (18f) ensures that each vehicle or rider is assigned as a starting point towards a rider at most once. Eq. (18g) ensures that each rider is assigned as a destination from a vehicle location or a rider no more than once. Finally, eq. (18h) ensures that if a vehicle is connected to a rider, there would be an additional rider in the trip.
Note that eqs. (9) and (12) feeding into the objective function, include non-linear terms. We therefore introduce variables y k,r ∈ R + and z k,r ∈ R + , to replace the nonlinear terms in equations (9) and (12) respectively as shown in equations (19) and (20) .
Consequently the objective function in equation (17) transforms into the following:
where SW L denotes the value of the objective after linearization. To ensure that the variable y k,r equals its desired value, we introduce the following linearization constraints:
for every r ∈ R and every k ∈ A r . In a similar fashion, we introduce the following linearization constraints for variable z k,r :
for every k ∈ K and every r ∈ N k .
By incorporating the additional variables and constraints in equations (19) 
- (29) C. Reduction to Maximum Weighted Independent Set
To assess the complexity of Model 2, we present a reduction to the MWIS problem. We assume that in the largest instance, all vehicles and requests are adjacent to each other. In other words, all vehicles are compatible with all requests, and all requests are sharing-compatible. In that scenario, with K and R being the sets of vehicles and requests, respectively, we let C denote the set of all possible combinations, where |C| = |K||R| 2 − |K||R|. Assuming that all vehicles will be assigned, the set of all path-vehicle allocations is
. To prove the APXhardness of Model 2, we use an approximation-preserving reduction from MWIS.
Theorem 1. Model 2 is NP-Hard
Proof. We reduce an instance of MWIS, a known APX-hard 6 problem [19] , to an instance of Model 2. Given a weighted graph G = (V, E, w), the MWIS objective is to find a set of pairwise disjoint nodes S ⊆ V with maximum total weight.
Let the tuple (k, i, j) denote the ride-sharing trip of Model 2 with vehicle k in which the first passenger is i and the second is j, ∀k ∈ K, i, j ∈ R and i = j. Also let u i (k, i, j) and u j (k, i, j) denote the utilities of riders i and j respectively, for the trip (k, i, j) and u k (k, i, j) denote the utility of the vehicle.
Consider now the following representation; let G = (V, E, w) be a graph where each vertex represents a combination c = (k, i, j). An edge exists between vertices c n and c m if and only if the trip combinations c n and c m have a common element, i.e. a common vehicle or rider. Let:
denote the weight of vertex c = (k, i, j). We note that changing the order of two riders in a combination can result in a different weight for the corresponding vertex. That is because the detour or the wait time after the reordering can exceed either of the thresholds δ d , δ w set by the passengers, thus resulting in a different value of their utilities. We now prove the correctness of the above transformation. Let OP T (I ) denote an optimal solution to a Model 2 instance I . For any two trip combinations c, c that either have a common rider or vehicle, at most one of them will be in OP T (I ) and the vertices representing these trips will be connected by an edge in graph G. As a result OP T (I ) is represented by a set of independent nodes in G and since the solution is optimal with cost r∈R u r + k∈K µ k = c∈V w c by equation (30) this corresponds to an independent set of maximum weight in G.
Conversely, suppose we have an optimal solution OP T (I) on an instance I of MWIS in G. Since OP T (I) is independent, no pair of nodes will be connected, so no pair of trips from WDP will have a common element. Again according to eq. (30), the total weight of the selected trips is maximised. 6 APX is the complexity class of optimization problems that cannot be approximated within some constant factor unless P = N P We notice that the above reduction preserves the approximation [19] . Let f be the (polynomial time) transformation from an instance I of Model 2 to an instance I of MWIS as described above i.e. I = f (I ) and let g be the (polynomial time) algorithm that produces a solution to I given a solution to I . Let also α = 1 and β = 1. Using transformation f , the optima of I and I satisfy the following inequality OP T (I ) ≤ αOP T (I). Furthermore, having a solution with weight w for any instance I , we can construct a solution for I with weight w such that |w − OP T (I)| ≤ β|w − OP T (I )| using algorithm g.
Corollary 1. Model 2 is APX-Hard.
Many greedy approximation algorithms have been previously proposed, with their approximation ratio expressed as a polynomial in terms of the average or maximum node degree in the graph [20] . We note that in the fully connected scenario, the average/maximum degree of node c is ∆ c = |R|(|R| − 1) − 1 + (|K| − 1)(4|R| − 6). To demonstrate this, if we consider a combination (k, i, j), there exist additional |R|(|R| − 1) − 1 trip combinations with vehicle k. For every other vehicle from the remaining |K|−1, there exist 2(|R|−1) trip combinations including rider i and an additional 2(|R|−2) including rider j, which are not already accounted. Thus, simplifying (|K| − 1)(2(|R| − 1) + 2(|R| − 2)) results to (|K| − 1)(4|R| − 6).
D. Local Search Algorithm using Greedy Search Initialisers
We established earlier that solving the MWIS problem for a fully connected CDA scenario, would involve finding a MWIS in graphs with |C| = |K||R| 2 − |K||R| nodes with an average/maximum node degree of ∆ c = |R|(|R| − 1) − 1 + (|K| − 1)(4|R| − 6). Considering a small localised example with 10 vehicles and 20 potential riders, that would generate a network with 3800 nodes with an average/maximum node degree of 1045.
An exact solution would, therefore, be impractical, as existing solution algorithms are slow even for a few hundreds of vertices [21] . We propose a local search algorithm based on simulated annealing (SA), a technique that has been shown to perform very well for the maximum clique problem (a similar premise, as it is the opposite of an independent set) [22] .
Simulated Annealing (SA) was initially proposed as a probabilistic method to solve difficult optimisation problems [23] . It aims to bring a system from an arbitrary initial state to an eventual state of minimum energy. Most SAs use an energy measure that is inversely proportional to the quality of the solution and is minimised using an iterative process. Starting from a seed solution, SA iterations generate several neighbouring solutions, which are accepted in accordance with a stochastic process. The process continues until the "temperature" of the problem reaches a user-defined minimum. A high-level structure of our SA algorithm for the MWIS problem is presented in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 utilizes a graph G, constructed to identify all possible vehicle-rider-rider combinations by representing them as a set of nodes. Each node in the set is a 3-tuple, c, w c , N c .
Algorithm 3 SA for the Independent Set Problem
Generate initial solution S 0 for graph G Set initial and minimum temperatures T 0 , T min
where α is a constant and α < 1) end while Output: S best , E best c refers to the combination of vehicle-rider-rider in the form of k, i, j , w c refers to the weight of the node as defined in Section II-C and N c is a list of neighbouring nodes. It can be easily shown that the degree of each vertex is equal to |N c |.
To construct the graph we set N c = ∅ and iterate through the network nodes to populate N c for each vertex. As with Algorithm 4, this process requires |K||R| 2 iterations (fully connected scenario) to create the set of vertices V . Populating N c for each vertex (and creating the edge set E), requires |V | 2 iterations (Algorithm 5). Since |V | 2 = (|K||R| 2 ) 2 , the complexity of the worst case scenario for network generation is O(|K| 2 |R| 4 ). This process, however, can be easily parallelised. [20] is used to obtain an initial solution S 0 , consisting of an ordered set of vertices in V . These operate by sorting vertices in a descending order with respect to w c , 1/|N c |, w c /|N c | and w c / i∈Nc w i , respectively. The best solution among these four is identified through inspection.
Algorithm 4 Vertex Generation Process
To calculate the energy of a solution (Algorithm 6), we
iterate through the ordered vertex sequence S. At each step, we add the next vertex in S to the independent set I and removing its neighbours from S. Iterations continue until S is empty. The energy of the solution is, therefore, equal to the negative sum of all values w c , for each vertex within I.
Algorithm 6 Energy Calculation
Non-empty ordered sequence
, (obtain N ci from G) end while E = − i∈I w ci , (obtain w ci from G) Output: E When it comes to the generation of neighbouring solutions, we randomly select two vertices in the independent set I of the old solution S old and switch their positions in S old to produce sequence S new . This approach increases the chance that sequence S new will produce a different independent set and energy than S old . Finally, we form our stochastic selection method on defining an acceptance probability for every new solution, which is calculated using E old , E new and temperature T as shown in Algorithm 7. Better solutions are always accepted, whereas worse solutions have less chance of being accepted as the iterations progress (i.e. as temperature T decreases).
E. Trip Price Determination
Optimal solutions of the WDP in CDAs produce efficient outcomes which are individually rational. That is, assuming participants in the auction are truthful about their valuations. There is, however, no guarantee that auction participants (bidders) will state their true valuations. [15] explains this problem with an example of three bidders. We will extend this example to our CDA, to illustrate how untruthful bids can arise.
Let us consider a CDA scenario involving three riders (bidders) and one vehicle. Let us also assume that from the Algorithm 7 Selection Process
Outputs: S old , E old six possible allocation combinations, the following three yield a positive value for total trade surplus:
In eqs. (31)- (33), f r ( S ) and b k ( S ) represent total valuation and cost for a rider r and a vehicle k, respectively, for a trip with a pickup sequence S. Using Model 2, the platform allocates the trip with the only vehicle servicing riders 1 and 2 in the sequence 1, 2 as it is the combination producing the highest trade surplus. Note that riders 1 and 2, assuming everyone bids truthfully, can report a lower value per time and still win the auction with the same combination.
The inclusion of additional riders will give rise to more complex bidding strategies. In the case that riders 1 and 2 reduce their bids excessively, they might lose in the auction. This characteristic CDA property is known as the threshold problem [24] and refers to the implication of valuation misreporting thresholds for individual participants, which can motivate bidders to employ perverse bidding strategies [25] .
Pricing in VCG auctions, where bidders pay the difference of welfare in their absence with the welfare of others when they are included in the auction, is incentive-compatible [15] . Furthermore, incentive-compatible payments have been derived through the solution of dual relaxed linear problems (LPs) of the WDP [26] . Previous studies [10] , [27] , [28] , used relaxed dual WDP problems to identify allocation and pricing in double auctions, with Lagrangean multipliers to be considered as prices. It has been shown that optimal dual variables in LP coincide with VCG payments [29] .
However, the use of near-optimal CDA solutions does not preserve incentive compatibility [30] . Negligible variations from the optimal objective can have significant consequences on the payments to be made by bidders [31] . As such, an approximate WDP solution would inhibit the use of VCG or dual LP relaxations that would guarantee incentive-compatibility.
To identify the extent of the threshold problem, we investigate the robustness of pricing riders on their valuations. We assume that the platform classifies AV costs as per vehicle model and therefore is always truthful.
III. DISCUSSION
Our assignment approach was implemented using Python and tested on a workstation with an Intel i7-4790 CPU (3.6GHz) and 8GB RAM. Exact solutions were obtained using a Branch and Bound algorithm provided by the ECOS BB package [32] , with a maximum of 1000 iterations.
To test the algorithm, we create a case study network set in Manhattan, NY. The underline road network and travel times were obtained using the OSMnx library [33] . To account for congestion, we applied a 20% penalty to the free-flow speeds in residential and motorway link segments, and 40% elsewhere. Rider origin-destination pairs, as well as vehicle locations, were sampled uniformly in space to create CDA instances. Only trips with travel time that is greater than 5 minutes were considered, while δ w and δ d were both set to 10 minutes each.
For this study, we used UK-based estimates of working time valuations [34] for the derivation of rider valuations. Vehicles were assumed to have a capacity of two customers, with their operating costs B k sampled from a log-normal distribution with a mean value of 12.96 GBP/hour and σ = 0.02. Conversely, customer time valuations C r were sampled from a log-normal distribution with a mean of 17.69 GBP/hour and σ = 0.02.
The maximum reservation price F r for each request was derived using the following generalised cost equation as the difference between a perceived market norm and the platform:
where E(P rice) is the expected price per minute for a shared trip in a competing platform, lasting P r minutes if private, and assumed to have a value of 0.75 GBP/min. E(W ait) and E(Detour) refer to the expected wait and detour times of competitors, set to 5 and 15 minutes respectively. Table II provides a performance comparison of the Simulated Annealing (SA) and the Branch and Bound (BB) algorithms for a range of instances. As can be seen in the table, the BB approach only manages to close the optimality gap within the predetermined number of iterations only for very small instances (i.e. less than 12 riders). For instances where BB is successfully applied, the SA approach identifies a solution within 1% of the known optimum. Conversely, for instances where the BB algorithm terminates before converging to an optimum, the SA method can identify solutions that are up to 3%.
A visual comparison of the results obtained by the BB and SA algorithms is provided in figures 2a and 2b, respectively, for an instance involving 10 vehicles, 20 customers and two edges per match outlines the similarities between solutions obtained using the two approaches. 
A. Trade surplus implications
A large number of problem instances where considered, with fleet sizes ranging between 3 and 40 vehicles, and a customer base of 10 to 60 riders. Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the relationship between problem sizes and algorithm run times, which is found to be in polynomial time. From the range of greedy heuristics that were considered for SA initialisation described in section II-D, the weight-based approach was found to yield the best results (Figure 4) .
The relationship between the objective value (equation (21)) and problem sizes is found to follow an increasing concave downward curve (Figure 5a ), indicating that the problem size increases at a higher rate than the solution value. Figure  5b illustrates that there exists a linear relationship between objective values and the number of served requests, indicating that the SA approach remains effective even at larger instances.
We define the trade surplus index (TSI) as the ratio of the objective value and the number of assigned vehicles in each instance. Figures 6a and 6b illustrate its relationship with the fleet coverage index (FCI), defined as the ratio of vehicles available against the number of vehicles required to serve all requests. An interesting feature of our approach (as shown in Figures 6a and 6b) is that the TSI is inversely proportional to the FCI for values of the latter between 0 and 1, and remains constant beyond that point.
This pattern can be explained by considering a scenario with 1 vehicle and 10 riders. In this case, the node with the highest weight will be the solution in the MWIS problem. The addition of a new vehicle (with the same cost), assuming that it is included in the MWIS solution, will lead to a reduction in the average node weight. This trend will persist with further increases in the size of the fleet, as riders with lower valuations are accommodated and gradually reduce the overall TSI. As such, once F CI > 1 the TSI will on average remain constant, consistent with the notion of market equilibrium while supply increases beyond current demand levels. 
B. Pricing robustness
To gain insights into the effects of the threshold problem (section II-E) and its implications to the effectiveness of our SA implementation, we examined a fixed CDA instance (15 vehicles, 40 requests) with varying rider valuations. We assumed that at most 30 requests are serviceable, while per minute rider valuations C r ranged between [0.0432, 1.474] 7 . We introduce the variables Q r,1 (35) and Q r,2 (36) that gauge the probability that a rider r will be assigned to the first and second pickup spots, respectively. A combined estimate Q r (37) is used to obtain the overall likelihood of a successful CDA outcome for r. The variables α and β in equations (35) and (36) are constants determined via calibration. The parameter values for equations (35)-(37) are provided in table III. 7 The lower bound was calculated using the average cost per hour such that 0.0432 × 60 = 12.96/5. The upper bound was calculated using the average valuation per hour such that 1.474 × 60 = 17.69 × 5. In the above, the termsĀ, G r , H r and E r are obtained using equations (38)-(41):
Equation (38) denotes the average number of neighboring vehicles for all requestsĀ, while in (39), G r is the average wait time for request r if picked up first. H r in (40) is the average time to the subsequent request for request r if picked up first. Conversely, E r in (41) is the average wait time for request r when picked up as the second passenger.
For each rider we consider the number of successful CDA bids, as well as their wait and the duration of any detours. From a total of 30 trial valuations per rider, we calculate the proportion of successful bids S r , which as shown in Figure  7a , exhibits a moderate correlation with Q r , with a Pearson coefficient 0.5186.
This suggests that factors other than rider valuations also play a role in determining auction winners. To establish this, we proceed by equating α and β with 0.75 + C r and C r respectively in equations (36) and (37) to best emulate the rider utility in equation (10) , factored by the estimated volume of combinable trips for each rider. To assist our analysis we introduce the term of customer inconvenience L r as the sum of wait and detour time for each rider r. We then refer to fairness as the notion of decreasing inconvenience with increasing bid valuation.
To determine the fairness of the auction over a range of C r values, we perform a regression analysis between Q r (C r ) and the inconvenience values L r for each rider. Figure 7b , outlines the distribution of the correlation coefficients between the modified quality metric Q r (C r ) and inconvenience L r for all riders.
In observing the results in 7b, we can deduce our proposed local search algorithm is capable of identifying acceptable solutions to the CDA, with a negative correlation between the values of Q r (C r ) and L r for most riders. As expected, riders with higher bids are more likely to secure a trip in the solution and are also likely to gain in time savings. However, due to the spatiotemporal structure of the model, the notion of fairness is not the same for each rider. Furthermore, given that our local search algorithm provides an approximate solution, some irregularities in allocations are expected when compared to the optimal solution. We note that incremental increases in rider valuations do not result in incremental improvement in inconvenience, which reflects the combinatorial nature of the model.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the problem of ride-sharing assignment and pricing in TNC platforms with autonomous vehicles. Our proposed dynamic assignment and pricing approach utilises a local search algorithm that solves a WDP MILP variant near optimally in polynomial time by computing 3-dimensional assignments to maximise trade surplus. By investigating the robustness of our proposed pricing mechanism we concluded that riders, increase their chances of winning the auction by increasing their bid values and are also likely to achieve results with improved wait and detour times in doing so. These effects, however, are restricted by the combinatorial reach of each rider in the auction. Our suggestions for future research in this area are twofold. First, we believe that both computational complexity and accuracy improvements are possible in exploring the breadth of meta-heuristics and machine learning algorithms in solving the proposed problem of ride-sharing auctions. Spatial clustering of requests, for example, could split much larger instances than the ones tested into parallel problems, which could be solved in a reasonable time, without compromising much of the efficiency of the algorithm. Secondly, studies which focus on analysing large data-sets of solutions for our proposed algorithm (or a variant of it), could aid in structuring a ridesharing auction which is based on reasonable bid suggestions provided by the TNC to the riders. The former system of bid suggestions by TNCs could address the threshold problem in combinatorial auctions and provide a stable combinatorial auction system to be used in practice.
